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Abstract:
The paper analyses role of military spending and number of military personnel in India and 
Pakistan in conflict mitigation. The paper finds that Pakistan’s military spending is a cause of 
deterrence from Indian hegemony in the region confirming the defence literature that puts the 
role of military as a strategic asset for a country. The paper also suggests that both democracy 
and economic development puts downward pressures on India and Pakistan hostilities 
however democracy is not a sufficient condition in itself to mitigate conflict. The innovation 
of the paper is that it constructs real proxies of conflict from the defence literature and utilizes 
defence spending in the analysis as a means to a peaceful resolution between bilateral issues 
within South Asian region.
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1. Introduction: Rational behind Military Spending?
One of the main duties of a sovereign country is to protect its territory and people from 
violence emanating from other countries or from non-state actors such as terrorist groups. 
This duty can mainly be performed by means of military power. There is a substantial body of 
theoretical and empirical literature in political science and economics that seeks to explain 
defense spending. The theoretical explanations can be classified in three categories: (1) arms 
races; (2) organizational and bureaucratic politics; and (3) economic welfare maximization. The 
arms race literature, following Richardson (1960), explains time-series patterns of military 
expenditure in terms of action-reaction behavior between two rivals. It identifies three major 
influences: (a) the military spending of the other nation (rival) in the threat system (the 
‘reaction’, ‘defense’ coefficient); (b) the economic burden of defense (the ‘fatigue coefficient’); 
and (c) the underlying grievances held by one nation against the other (the ‘grievance’ 
coefficient). The arms-race model of military expenditure seems more suitable for countries 
involved in conflict or engaged in an enduring rivalry, such as the US–USSR Cold War rivalry 
(Majeski, 1985), the Indian–Pakistani (Deger and Sen, 1990), the Arab–Israeli (Mintz et al., 
1990), and the Greek–Turkish relationships (Kollias and Makrydakis, 1997). In these cases the 
military preparedness of the other represents the overwhelming security issue/consideration. 
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bargaining over the defense budget, starting from the status quo. It implies that the best 
predictor of new increments to military spending is simply the increments of the immediate 
past; that is, the main determinant of this year’s defense budget is last year’s budget (Correa 
and Kim, 1992). The economics literature tends to ignore bureaucratic or political processes. 
It uses a standard neo-classical model in which a nation-state is represented as a rational agent 
who maximizes a welfare function depending on security and economic variables subject to a 
budget constraint. Defense spending balances the welfare benefits of extra security derived 
from military expenditure against its opportunity costs in terms of forgone civilian output 
(Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2001; Avramides, 1997; Smith, 1995). Economic resources are 
usually proxied by GDP; external threat by military spending in the nation’s rival(s) as well as 
in country’s allies; domestic economic factors by variables such as the budget deficit, inflation, 
unemployment; political variables, by variables such as the ideology of the political party in 
power and the electoral cycle. Most studies on the demand for military spending employ time-
series analysis for individual countries but there are also a few cross-sectional studies (for 
instance, Dunne and PerloFreeman, 2001). Country studies have produced mixed results for 
the main determinants of defense spending, making it difficult to come up with useful 
generalizations.
Developing countries have enough problems without either the waste of resources constituted 
by military expenditure, or the social and economic destruction brought about by warfare. 
Some of the strongest empirical influences on military expenditure reflect either neighborhood 
arms races, or the patronage demands of politically powerful military establishments. Both of 
these problems are potentially addressable. One of the other major influences on military 
expenditure in developing countries is internal rebellion. Where civil wars are ongoing military 
expenditure is greatly elevated. Further, there is evidence that governments set their defense 
expenditure at levels designed to deter such rebellions. Since, poor economic performance is 
a major risk factor, high military expenditure, by contributing to such poor performance, may 
inadvertently contribute to the risks that it is attempting to reduce. Both military expenditure 
and war retard development. This is not surprising, but there is now reasonable quantitative 
evidence on the scale of the effects. Military expenditure diverts government resources that 
could be put to better use – public services, infrastructure, or lower taxes. 
For developing countries, the adverse effects of a given level of military expenditure on income 
are probably even more costly than for the global average. In developed countries such 
expenditure may in part be concealed routes for providing subsidies to high-tech firms, hence 
the term “military-industrial complex.” In the poorer developing countries military equipment 
is imported, rather than produced domestically and so does not offer any side-benefits to 
technical progress. For developing countries by far the most common form of war is civil war. 
Whereas international warfare is often quite brief, civil wars last a long time – typically around 
seven years. Such wars are getting longer – they now appear to continue for around three times 
as long as the civil wars prior to 1980. The cost of civil war is considerable. During the war 
the growth rate is typically reduced by around 2 percent. The losses can sometimes continue 
post-war: for example, people may continue to move their wealth out of the country due to 
perceived high risks of further conflict. Such perceptions would often not be misplaced. 
Developing countries have astonishing levels of poverty, yet their governments choose to 
devote a significant proportion of their resources to military spending which, as discussed 
above, actually retards growth and so accentuates that poverty. The global average for military 
spending is around 3.5 percent of GDP, but the ranges from virtually zero, to an astonishing 
45 percent. Five factors are driving these large differences: 1. Active international warfare 2. 
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civil war 5. Beneficiaries and vested interests The most obvious is that high military 
expenditure is sometimes a response to active warfare. 
There are also large differences in military spending among countries that are at peace. We 
find that one important influence on spending is if there is a past history of international war. 
Countries that have such a history spend around 1.3 percent of GDP more than countries that 
have not. Possibly this reflects an assessment of the higher risk of future conflict. However, it 
may also reflect inertia or political interests – once a country has built a large military, as 
happens during war, there are internal forces maintaining the level of government expenditure. 
Such persistence would not be surprising; it is indeed common in other areas of public 
expenditure. To the extent that a past war raises military expenditure because of a perceived 
higher risk of further war, it reflects fear of neighbors, or aggressive intentions towards them. 
We might therefore expect that the level of military expenditure chosen by a government 
would, to an extent, be influenced by the level chosen by its neighbors. This is indeed what 
we find. That is, the average level of spending of neighboring countries significantly influences 
the level chosen by a government. This can be interpreted in various ways, the most obvious 
of which is that of a neighborhood arms race. For most countries the most serious external 
threat comes from their neighbors and so the appropriate level of deterrence is set by the 
behavior of neighbors. A different interpretation of the same phenomenon is that military 
expenditure is set by regional norms of behavior, in a form of emulation. If the neighbors are 
spending a particular share of national income on defense, then the chiefs of the military, or 
the minister of defense, have a relatively easy case to argue with the minister of finance, that 
their own country should spend approximately at the same level. Whatever the interpretation, 
the consequence of this regional spillover effect is that military expenditure is, in effect, a 
regional public bad. Each time one country raises its military expenditure there will be a ripple 
effect across the region. Further, as neighbors respond to the initial increase, the country that 
increased its military expenditure may itself respond with further increases – the classic process 
of an arms race. We estimate that the typical multiplier from an initial increase in spending in 
one country to the new neighborhood equilibrium may involve both the country and its 
neighbors having increased the level of spending by around three times the initial increase. 
While the threat of international war is clearly one concern that might motivate military 
spending, for most developing country governments internal rebellion is a far more likely 
threat than international war. Currently, civil wars are around ten times as common as 
international wars. Thus, military expenditure may often be motivated by the desire to defend 
the government from the threat of rebellion. 
The above motivations for military expenditure have either been to fight a war or to deter it. 
However, these are not the only motivations for military spending. As with other forms of 
public expenditure, military expenditure has beneficiaries. In developed countries these 
beneficiaries are largely industrial companies that produce military hardware. Developing 
countries largely import such hardware and so the domestic beneficiaries are predominantly 
military employees. We might therefore expect that where military employees have a lot of 
influence over government decisions, the government will be persuaded to choose a higher 
level of military expenditure. This is a natural tendency – if professors were in charge of a 
government they would probably increase expenditure upon universities. This is a testable 
proposition because there is one readily observable circumstance in which military employees 
indeed have considerable influence over government decisions, namely if the government is a 
military dictatorship. Indeed, where the military is in charge of the government, military 
efficiency is likely to decline since there is no independent source of scrutiny and evaluation 
of performance. Some of these motivations suggest that military expenditure could be 
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spending reflects neighborhood arms races, it is potentially feasible to negotiate mutual 
reductions in spending. Since most developing countries receive aid inflows, it might 
conceivably be possible to strengthen confidence in such agreements by linking them to the 
conditions for aid eligibility. This might be done in the context of voluntarism: that is, a 
neighborhood might request the international community to assist the enforcement of its 
agreement. However, aid donors might also reasonably require that countries in receipt of aid 
inflows should avoid large levels of military expenditure. Such a use of donor conditionality 
could arise both to promote neighborhood arms reduction, and to discipline military 
governments that would otherwise indulge their own sector in excessive expenditure. (see 
Collier, P, 2006; pp 1-5)
2. Literature Review on the Dynamics of Military Spending: Empirical versus 
Theoretical Models
There is now a large body of empirical literature investigating the economic effects of military 
spending, with little consensus as to what these effects might be. The early cross-country 
correlation analyses of Benoit (1973; 1978) quickly gave way to a variety of econometric 
models, reflecting different theoretical perspectives. Keynesian, neoclassical and structuralist 
models were applied using a variety of specifications, econometric estimators and types of 
sample in cross-section, timeseries or panels. The diversity of results led to arguments for case 
studies of individual countries and relatively homogeneous groups of countries. Dunne (1996) 
provides a survey of this work. The mainstream growth literature has not found military 
expenditure to be a significant factor in explaining growth. For instance, Sala-i-Martin et al. 
(2004) consider 67 variables, including the initial share of military spending, as possible 
determinants of growth 1960-1996 in a cross-section of 88 countries. Using Bayesian 
averaging, they find 18 variables that appear significant, with a posterior inclusion probability 
of better than 10%. The share of military spending ranks 45, with a probability of 2.1%. There 
are many similar findings. In contrast to this, many papers in the defence economics literature 
have found military expenditure to be a significant determinant of growth. The difference 
seems to come largely from the use of different models. In defence economics the Feder-Ram 
model tends to be widely used, while it is not used in the mainstream growth literature. Given 
the disjunction between the mainstream growth literature and the defence economics literature 
it seems useful to provide a review of the issues and contrast the approaches. However, there 
are other approaches that suggest that defence economics may be able to contribute to the 
growth debate. 
The vast literature on the economic effects of military expenditure has suggested a large 
number of different channels through which military expenditure may influence output. Smith 
(2000) and Dunne (1996), provide more detail and references, but here we will briefly list them 
to indicate the range of possibilities, rather than provide references or evaluation. They can be 
broadly grouped into demand effects, supply effects and security effects. Demand effects 
operate through the level and composition of expenditure. The most obvious is the Keynesian 
multiplier effect, an exogenous increase in military spending increases demand and, if there is 
spare capacity, increases utilisation and reduces unemployment of resources. 
Underconsumption theories reverse this causation and explain military expenditure by the 
government’s need to manage demand. Military expenditures have opportunity costs and may 
crowd out other forms of expenditure, such as investment. The extent and form of crowding 
out following an increase in military spending will depend on prior utilisation and how the 
increase is financed. The government budget constraint requires that an increase in military 
expenditure be financed by: cuts in other public expenditure, increased taxes, increased 
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way the increase is financed will have further effects, e.g. a larger deficit may raise real interest 
rates, which feeds back on the economy. Increases in military expenditure will also change the 
composition of industrial output, with input-output effects. Similar arguments apply to cuts in 
military expenditure, though the effects may not be symmetric. Supply effects operate through 
the availability of factors of production (labour, physical and human capital and natural 
resources) and technology, which together determine potential output. Some of the demand 
effects, e.g. crowding out of investment, may also have supply effects by changing the capital 
stock. The literature differs in whether the focus is on total output, including that used by the 
military, or just civilian output. Conscription and other forms of coercion as well as ideological 
fervour may increase the mobilisation of factors of production, particularly during times of 
perceived threat of war, but the resources mobilised are mainly used for military purposes. 
Clearly resources used by the military are not available for civilian use, but there may be 
externalities. Training in the armed forces may make workers more or less productive when 
they return to civilian employment. Military R&D may have commercial spin-offs. Security of 
persons and property from domestic or foreign threats is essential to the operation of markets 
and the incentives to invest and innovate. To the extent that military expenditure increases 
security it may increase output. Adam Smith noted that the first two duties of the state were 
‘that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent 
societies….that of protecting, as far as possible, every member of society from the injustice or 
oppression of every member of it’. In many poor countries, war and lack of security are major 
obstacles to development. However, military expenditure may be driven not by security needs 
but by a rent seeking military industrial complex and military expenditures may provoke arms 
races or damaging wars and in such cases there would not be positive security effects. Many 
of these effects are contingent, depending on such things as the degree of utilisation, how the 
military expenditure is financed, the externalities from military spending and the effectiveness 
of military expenditure in countering the threat. These factors are likely to vary over countries 
and over time, with the consequence that the economic effect of military spending will also 
vary. The time horizons of these effects are very different, some are quite short-run others 
very long-run. All these measurements have to be done within the context of a particular 
model. Gleditsch et al. (1996) contains a large number of studies using country specific models.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
Since interstate conflict involves at least two parties, it is a dyadic concept. This current 
research involved constructing dyadic proxies for India-Pakistan interstate trade, military 
burden, development expenditure, economic development and democracy to test the five 
hypotheses presented above. Data definitions appear in the appendix.
Measuring conflict
The literature on interstate conflict classifies conflict data sets into two categories: 1) war data 
and 2) events data (Polachek and Seiglie 2006). War data sets focus on the more hostile aspects 
of interstate interactions such as crises, wars or militarised interstate disputes (Jones, Bremer 
and Singer 1996). The most comprehensive war data set is available under the Correlates of 
War Project (COW), which has updated war data sets employed by Wright (1942), Richardson 
(1960), and Singer and Small (1972). The other major data set on interstate armed conflict is 
hosted by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) with the collaboration of the 
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and is collected on an annual basis and 
covers the full post-World War II period, 1946–2003. Events data focuses on all interstate 
events and bilateral interactions reported in newspapers. McClelland’s (1978) World Events 
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occurring during 1966-1992, reported in The New York Times. Azar’s (1980) Conflict and Peace 
Data Bank (COPDAB) is an extensive longitudinal collection of about one million daily events 
reported from 47 newspaper sources between 1948 and 1978. Since this paper is interested in 
the evolution of the India-Pakistan conflict over the last 55 years, the Uppsala/PRIO and 
COW interstate war data set will be used instead of events-based data sets because the former 
data sets provide conflict data, which covers most of the period of 55 years (1950-2005) 
selected for this analysis. Events data set is not available for the entire period. Although the 
events data set captures daily observations, the macroeconomic and democracy data varies 
annually, which limits the use of daily information on conflict. Hostility between India and 
Pakistan has been high most of the last 55 years, enabling the COW data set to capture the 
severity of conflict during most of the dispute. Greater coverage by the COW and Uppsala 
data sets, and availability of macroeconomic and democracy data on an annual basis limits the 
scope of using the events data sets. 
Six different measures of conflict are carefully compiled by using COW and Uppsala datasets:
1. Annual fatality Levels ranging 0-6 (Fatal)
2. Precise number of deaths (Volfatal)
3. Number of days of conflict in a year (Dur)
4.  Highest action in disputes taken by both India and Pakistan (Hiact)
5. Annual hostility level severity (Hstlev)
6. Conflict intensity ranging 0-2 (Cnf)
There are several reasons for the selection of various proxies of conflict. The most appropriate 
proxy and the one which is most closely linked to conflict (or its severity) are number of deaths 
in the battlefield. Not only that, number of death variable has a higher level of variation among 
yearly observations but they are also more random, while subtly establishing nature of ongoing 
conflict which sometimes resulted in outright war. We know from Hstlev that hostilities have 
remained high through out periods of 1950-2007, but it is more interesting to know the ground 
realities of the battle field, where with the exceptions of three major wars when battle ground 
constitutes larger international borders between both States, Pakistan and India’s exchange of 
fire concentrates on the ‘Line of Control’. (See high conflict zone maps for India and Pakistan 
at the end of the chapter)  There are two proxies for number of deaths in battle field. One is 
Volfatal capturing exact number of deaths and Fatal which capture annual fatality level to the 
scale of (0-6). Volfatal (exact number of deaths) have ever higher levels of variation among 
data, where number of deaths in three major wars (1965, 1971 and 1999), reached highest 
thresh-holds of conflict (in thousands) with declaration of outright war and thus would appear 
as out-liars in such instances in the long term conflict where number of deaths have remained 
low (less than a 100). In contrast, the variation because of indexation in Fatal becomes more 
subtle as the score would only vary between 0 and 6. 
That makes Fatal a preferred proxy and Volfatal as the second best one. Dur (Days of conflict), 
Hiact (Higest Action in disputes) and Hstlev (Annual Hostility Levels) are also useful proxies. 
They capture the severity of conflict with a different angle. Inclusion of these measures in the 
analysis would help us carry out robustness check for the results on Fatal. Larger set of conflict 
measures would enable us to evaluate the statistical validity of the larger model. Furthermore, 
utilizing more proxies of conflict provides better insight into the nature of conflict, especially 
when causality tests are undertaken. Remember, Causality tests would show which measures 
of conflict (if employed more than one, as in our case) would have an effect on our 
endogenous independent variables (i.e, military burdern, bilateral or multilateral trade). 
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Generally, the sum of imports and exports between actor and target countries captures dyadic 
trade. (Polachek and Seglie 2006) In the last 60 years the patterns of interstate trade between 
Pakistan and India changed. Before trade between both countries collapsed to near zero in the 
early 1970s, Pakistan was exporting more to India. Since the 1970s, Pakistan imports more. In 
the 1950s, Pakistan and India’s trade with each other constituted a significant amount of their 
respective total trade. However, after the 1965 war, India-Pakistan trade never reached more 
than two per cent of their respective total trade levels. Until the late 1980s, India had been a 
relatively closed economy, whereas Pakistan has traditionally been more open. The researcher 
constructed two composite measures of India-Pakistan trade. They are Pakistan’s total trade 
with India as a percentage of Pakistan’s total trade (Tpitp), and India’s trade with Pakistan as a 
percentage of India’s total trade (Tpiti). The expectation is for both trade proxies to relate 
negatively with conflict. It would be interesting to investigate whether trade between both 
countries as a share of each country’s total trade also affects the responsiveness of bilateral 
trade in conflict mitigation. If trade reduces conflict, trade with more countries should reduce 
conflict even more. (Dorussen 1999) Thus, it is important to investigate how more trade with 
the rest of the world affects India-Pakistan hostilities. This research involves eight dyadic 
proxies to capture the combined international integration levels for both countries. Pakistan’s 
total trade as a ratio of India’s total trade (Xmpi), and its inverse, India’s total trade as a ratio 
of Pakistan’s total trade (Xmip) are the first two indicators. If both of these trade proxies relate 
negatively with hostilities, the clear conclusion is that any external trade competition does not 
increase bilateral rivalry between India and Pakistan, but instead both countries have similar 
trade policies or could integrate within regional bodies like SAARC (the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation). However, any evidence of a positive relationship 
between conflict and these two trade proxies would suggest that the competition in 
international markets has significant implications in sustaining their rivalry. 
Measuring military expenditure
Military expenditures can reflect hostility, as well as deterrence. (Polachek and Seglie 2006) In 
the India-Pakistan case, it is vital to examine how each county’s military expenditure/military 
burden affects the dispute. Pakistan’s spending on military expenditure as a proportion of 
GDP is higher than India’s. Additionally, since military expenditures may also capture the 
capability of a country to deal with civil unrest or intra-state conflict, the high prevalence of 
continuing intra-state conflicts in various regions of India can also explain India’s military 
expenditures. Pakistan has had fewer civil wars. This may mean that Pakistan’s military burden 
captures its security concerns vis-à-vis India solely. If so, dyadic variables that take the military 
burden of Pakistan as a ratio of the Indian military burden, should affect conflict positively 
and vice versa. Here are the eight different dyadic proxies of military burden utilising data on 
military expenditures as well as military personnel constructed from Correlates of Wars. 
Military expenditures can either reflect aggression or deterrence, as we have posited above.  
We need to examine country specific dynamics of military spending to find out how each 
country’s military expenditure/military burden affects the dispute. We already know that 
Pakistan’s spending on military expenditure as a proportion of GDP is higher than India’s 
(figure 3). Additionally, since military expenditures may also capture the capability of a country 
to deal with civil unrest or intra-state conflict, Indian military expenditure can also be explained 
in terms of the high prevalence of continuing intra-state conflicts in various regions of India. 
Pakistan has had fewer civil wars. This may mean that Pakistan’s military burden captures its 
security concerns principally vis-à-vis India. Thus to go beyond  average dyadic investigation 
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which take military expenditure of Pakistan as a ratio of Indian military expenditure (Lmilbrd2) 
and the inverse (Lmilbrd3) in addition to taking average of India and Pakistan’s military 
expenditures (Lmilbrd1). If, as we speculate, Pakistan’s military burden is more closely related 
to conflict than India’s, Lmilbrd2 will have a positive sign and the inverse (Lmilbrd3) should 
have a negative sign, thus showing denominator effects of the inverse. (See Notes at the end 
of the chapter for details) 
1. Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of India’s defence 
expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd 1). 
2. Log of India’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd 2). 
3. Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd 3). 
4. Log of India’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd4). 
5. Log of India’s defence expenditure average over GDP and Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd5). 
6. Log of Pakistan and India’s GDP weighted average of defence expenditures 
(Lmilbrd6). The proportion of military personnel to the total population represents 
the extent of militarisation in a society. 
7. Log of Pakistan military personnel over Pakistan’s total population as a ratio of 
India’s military personnel over India’s total population (LMilppi). 
8. Log of India’s military personnel over India’s total population as a ratio of Pakistan’s 
military personnel over Pakistan’s total population (LMilppi). 
Note that the first two proxies are the inverse of each other and expected to reveal the 
relative sensitivity of each country’s military expenditure to conflict. Proxies 3 and 4 are a 
robustness check with military expenditures of each country divided by the combined military 
expenditure score of both countries. If Lmilbrd3 is positively associated with conflict, this 
hypothesis can substitute for Lmilbrd1. If Pakistan’s military expenditure is more closely 
associated with their bilateral conflict and if Indian military expenditure captures the element 
of deterrence, as well as belligerence with other national and international rivals, then the 
combined military expenditures should have lower explanatory value than Pakistan’s military 
expenditure alone but the sign for combined military score should remain positive. This paper 
strives to investigate the average effects of military expenditures by both countries on India-
Pakistan rivalry by taking two more proxies of military burden. This is to investigate whether 
military burden has on average a conflict enhancing effect, irrespective of country of origin, 
after analysing its country specific application for deterrence or belligerence.  
Measuring democracy, growth and other variables 
To capture democracy levels for India and Pakistan required use of the Polity IV project 
hosted by The Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). 
Polity IV computes a combined polity score by subtracting autocracy scores from democracy 
scores for the corresponding year. The value of this Polity score ranges from -10 to 10, where 
-10 denotes the highest autocracy level, and 10 denotes the maximum democracy score. 
Although India always takes a high positive value of seven or above, Pakistan frequently takes 
on negative values. The next step involved constructing a dyadic variable of democracy for 
both countries by multiplying their Polity scores, following Polachek and Seiglie (2006), adding 
10 to each country’s polity series to make the negative polity values positive so that the 
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combined democracy score captures the variations in the democratisation process only on a 
positive scale. The dyadic democracy variable shows values as low as 50 on the scale of 0 to 
400 when there are high levels of political dissimilarities between Pakistan (dictatorship) and 
India (democracy), and as high as 350 when both countries are governed by democracies (see 
figure 2). 
The weighted average of India and Pakistan’s real GDP per capita growth rates (Gpi) 
represents the dyadic proxy of economic progress for both countries. Constructing the series 
for both countries involved taking GDP at constant prices (taken from economic surveys) and 
dividing it by population levels. The researcher tallied the data using the GDP per capita series 
available in the World Development Indicators (2006) data set. The four different proxies of 
social development based on India and Pakistan’s education data1 are, GDP weighted average 
of per capita education expenditure; mean average of per-capita education expenditure; 
Pakistan and India’s education expenditures as a ratio of Pakistan and Indian’s GDP; and the 
average of Pakistan’s education expenditure as a percentage of its GDP and India’s education 
expenditure as a percentage of its GDP. Note that the first two proxies employ per-capita 
education expenditure and the last two proxies employ total education expenditure. The 
purpose of the four education proxies is to perform a robustness check on the role of 
education in conflict mitigation. India and Pakistan are two of the most densely populated 
countries in the world. Pakistan has 160 million inhabitants, and India has more than one 
billion. In line with earlier literature, this thesis also uses the mean average of both countries 
populations as a standardising variable in the analysis. (see Polachek 1997)
Figure 1 Dyadic democracy scores for Pakistan and India
3.2. Methodology
Any simple least square regression analysis may lead to spurious results because of endogeneity 
problems among the variables (from trade, military spending, social sector expenditure and 
growth to conflict and vice-versa). It seems necessary to utilise a simultaneous equation model 
to address potential endogeneity problems between various variables. Since the data is a time-
series, it is appropriate to use Vector Autoregressive model (VAR), which is an extension of 
univariate Autoregressive (AR) models to capture the evolution and the interdependencies 
between multiple time-series. (Sims 1980) Treat all variables in a VAR symmetrically by 
including an equation for each variable explaining its evolution based on its own lags and the 
lags of other variables in the model. The number of equations in a VAR model depends upon 
the number of endogenous variables; each endogenous variable is regressed on its lagged value, 
and the lagged values of all other endogenous variables as well as any number of exogenous 
variables. This solves the problem of endogeneity among variables. In this sense, VAR model 
1 There is an insufficiently long time-series for public health spending data for India. 
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is a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model with lagged variables and/or deterministic 
terms as common regressors so that one can interpret the regression results for each equation 
as ordinary least square estimators. 
The basic lag vector autoregressive (VAR ) model has the formp )( p
(1)tptpttt yyycY   ......2211
where is a vector of constants (intercept), is a matrix (for every ) c )1( n i )( nn  pi ,....,1
and is a vector of error terms.t )1( n
A bivariate VAR(2) can be written as the following system of equations:
(2)tttttt yyyycy 12,2
2
2,12,1
2
1,11,2
1
2,11,1
1
1,111  
(3)tttttt yyyycy 22,2
2
2,22,1
2
1,21,2
1
2,21,1
1
1,222  
The lag length has to be determined by model selection criterion (MSC) because too p
many lagged terms will consume more degrees of freedom and may introduce the problem of 
multicollinearity. Introducing too few lags will lead to specification errors. One way of deciding 
this question is to use Akaike (AIC), Schwarz-Bayesian (BIC) or Hannan Quinn (HQ) criteria 
and choose the model that gives the lowest values of these criteria. AIC criterion 
asymptotically overestimates the order with positive probability, whereas BIC and HQ 
criterion estimate the order consistently under general conditions if the true order is less p
than or equal to .maxp
After fitting a VAR, it may be important to know which way causalities run. One way to 
do that is by running Granger causality tests after the VAR analysis. In a bivariate VAR model, 
a variable  is said to Granger-cause a variable  if, given the past values of , past values 2y 1y 1y
of are useful for predicting  (Granger 1969). Similarly it is feasible to extend the current 2y 1y
analysis to test Granger-causality for multivariate VAR ( ), where . p ),......,,( 21  ntttt yyyY
4. Results with VAR models 
This section reports the results of the multivariate VAR regression analysis. As we can see, the 
data set is purely time series, which may mean that most of the variables may simply only 
follow a random walk. Generally that is the case with most time series. (See detailed Notes at 
the end of the paper)  If a regression employs non-stationary or a mix of stationary and non-
stationary variables, the error term would suffer from autocorrelation which would in turn 
mean that the error term obtained from such a regression would also be non-stationary. 
Generally, non-stationarity in variables may be solved by taking first difference of the series. 
However, it is not necessary to always take first differences, and stationary may be achieved at 
levels by taking time lags of variables where time trends or random walks would not be 
observed anymore.  
Figure 2. Pakistan and India’s Dyadic Growth Rates
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As we have taken dyadic proxies, the problem of random walk may be minimised and we may 
obtain stationarity for our variables at levels rather than first differences. Table 6.2 undertakes 
unit root analysis to test for stationarity in the dyadic variables under the modified or 
augmented  Dickey-Fuller t test (DF-GLS) proposed by Elliot, Rothenberg & Stock (1996), 
where each series is transformed via a generalised least squares (GLS) regression before 
performing the test. The results show that we could effectively solve for unit-roots (random 
walk) at levels, although for some variables we only obtain stationarity after quite a number of 
lags. In case of Tpitp, taking lags up to 15 periods solves for the random walk. By contrast, the 
economic development variable capturing the dyadic growth rates for India and Pakistan (Gpi) 
has been observed to be a perfectly stationary series (figure 1). Unit-root test confirms this 
observation; stationarity is achieved at levels with 0 lags.
 
 
Table1. DF-GLS unit root tests
Variables Lag With intercept
With intercept and 
trend
Fatal (annual fatality levels, 0-6) 1 -3.528*** (Ng-Perron)
-3.774*** (Ng-
Perron)
Volfatal (precise numbers) 1 -4.789* **(Ng-Perron)
-4.844*** (Ng-
Perron)
Dur (days of conflict) 1 -4.058* **(Ng-Perron)
-4.233***(Ng-
Perron)
Hiact (highest action in disputes) 1 -2.382** (Ng-Perron) -2.590 (Ng-Perron)
Hstlev (annual hostility levels, 1-5) 1 -2.371** (Ng-Perron) -2.512  (Ng-Perron)
Cnf (conflict intensity ranges given by the PRIO-Uppsala data set) 1 -3.025* **(Ng-Perron)
-4.082***  (Ng-
Perron)
Tpitp (Pakistan-India bilateral trade as a proportion of Pakistan’s 
trade) 15
-1.112* (Ng-
Perron) -1.861  (Ng-Perron)
Tpiti (Above as a proportion of Indian trade) 15 -3.856***  (MAIC) -3.319** (Ng-Perron)
12
Xmpi (Pakistan’s total global trade as a ratio of India’s global trade) 2 -2.710*** (Ng-Perron)
-2.860* (Ng-
Perron)
Xmip (inverse of the above) 8 -4.951***  (MAIC) -4.923***   (MAIC)
Lxpi1 (Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and India’s total 
exports) 0 2.951** (D-Fuller) 2.951**  (D-Fuller)
Lxpi2 (Log mean of Pakistan’s total exports over Pakistan’s GDP and 
India’s total exports over India’s GDP) 0 -4.769*** (SIC) -4.929*** (SIC)
Lmpi1 (Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and India’s total 
imports) 1 -4.049*** (SIC) -3.961*** (SIC)
Lmpi2 (Log mean of Pakistan’s total imports as a proportion of 
Pakistan’s GDP and India’s total imports as a ratio of India’s GDP) 1 -4.511*** (SIC) -4.382*** (SIC)
Lmilbrd1 (Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s 
GDP as a ratio of India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP) 5
-2.209** (Ng-
Perron)
-2.795* (Ng-
Perron)
Lmilbrd2 (Inverse of the above) 5 -2.209**(Ng-Perron) -2.795*(Ng-Perron)
Lmilbrd3 (Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s 
GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s 
GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP)
5 -1.911*(Ng-Perron) -2.686*(Ng-Perron)
Lmilbrd4 (Log of India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP as a 
ratio of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP plus 
India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP)
5 -2.128*(Ng-Perron) -2.831*(Ng-Perron)
Lmilbrd5 (Log of Mean of India’s defence expenditure over GDP 
and Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP) 1 -4.735*** (SIC) -4.748*** (SIC)
Lmilbrd6 (Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and India’s 
defence expenditures) 0 - -4.308*** (SIC)
Lmilppi (Log of Pakistan’s military personnel over Pakistan’s total 
population as a ratio of India’s military personnel over India’s total 
population)
1 -4.082*** (SIC) -4.098*** (SIC)
Lmilpip (inverse of the above) 1 -4.082*** (SIC) -4.098*** (SIC)
Ledupi1 (log GDP weighted average of per capita education 
expenditure in India and Pakistan) 1 - -5.374*** (SIC)
Ledupi2 (log mean of per capita education expenditure in India and 
Pakistan) 1 - -5.478*** (SIC)
Ledupi3 (log of Pakistan and India’s education expenditures as a ratio 
of both GDPs) 1 -5.918*** (SIC) -5.907*** (SIC)
Ledupi4 (log of average of Pakistan’s education expenditure over 
GDP plus India’s education expenditure over GDP) 1 - -5.642*** (SIC)
Gpi (weighted average of GDP per capita growth rates for both 
countries) 0
-4.256*** (Ng-
Perron)
-4.276*** (Ng-
Perron)
Demopi (combined democracy scores) 7 -2.790*** (Ng-Perron)
-2.997*** (Ng-
Perron)
Poppi (average of total populations) 10 - -7.392*** (MAIC)
-***, ** and *shows significance at 1%, 5%and 10% level
-  The Lag structure is selected through (1) Ng-Perron sequential t (Ng-Perron), (2) the minimum Schwarz 
information criterion (SIC), (3) the Ng-Perron modified information criterion (MAIC) and (4) Dickey-Fuller test 
(D-Fuller). 
Proxies treated as endogenous variables include those for conflict, bilateral and multilateral 
trade, economic progress, military burden and social development; whereas the concepts 
treated as purely exogenous are dyadic democracy and population. Since, these time-series 
variables are stationary at levels, although with some time lags, this allows the use of 
unrestricted VAR analysis instead of restricted VECM methodology. It is now possible to 
proceed to VAR analysis. The reduced form VAR model for conflict is as follows
 (4)tttititititititititititt PDemoGEMilTrConfConf   87,6,5,4,3,21 
Where , , , , , and depict interstate conflict, bilateral or tConf itTr  itMil  itE  itG  tDemo tP
multilateral trade, military burden, education expenditure, real growth rate of GDP per-capita, 
dyadic democracy score and population respectively; t ranges from 1950-2007 and . pi ,....,1
Here is the optimal lag structure for the VAR model. and are p it,2 it,3 it,4 it,5 it,6
metrics (for every ).)66(  pi ,....,1
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Running the above model for the number of fatalities (Fatal), best captures the severity of 
the militarised conflict between the two nations. Later analysis employs other conflict proxies. 
Table 2 shows the results for bilateral trade with the eight proxies of military burden 
proposed. The evidence suggests that trade between Pakistan and India significantly decreases 
hostilities between both nations. However, the low values of coefficients suggest that it,3
bilateral trade has a limited role to play in conflict mitigation. This is not surprising because 
trade between Pakistan and India remained very low, and comprises only a small fraction of 
each country’s total international trade. Although low trade levels between both countries may 
very well be the cause of the ongoing conflict, the current analysis does not need to be 
concerned with reverse causality because the VAR model takes care of potential endogeneity 
problems between Fatal and Tpitp or Tpiti. On the other hand, Lmilbrd1, Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd3, 
Lmilbrd4, Lmilbrd5 and Lmilbrd6 all relate significantly with conflict, especially in the case of 
Tpitp. Lmilbrd1 and Lmilbrd3 relate negatively with conflict, and Lmilbrd2 and Lmilbrd4 
positively relate with conflict. This confirms the hypothesis that Pakistan’s high military 
expenditure is a close determinant of the India-Pakistan conflict. 
The high values of the coefficients in this case indicate that any increase in military it,4
expenditure by Pakistan when compared to India correlates with higher conflict. However 
negative signs of Lmilbrd2 and Lmilbrd4 also suggest that India’s military expenditure is weakly 
related to conflict whereas as Indian military expenditure is also directed at its domestic civil 
wars and security concerns with other states and thus in the case of Lmilbrd1, Lmilbrd2, 
Lmilbrd3 and Lmilbrd4 the explanatory power comes from Pakistan’s military expenditure. 
Furthermore, combined military scores in Lmilbrd5 and Lmilbrd5 relate positively with conflict 
and the relationship is significant for both proxies of bilateral trade. This result suggests that 
irrespective of Indian security concerns national or international, or Pakistan’s anxieties about 
Indian hegemony, military expenditures on average do not have deterrent effect (in terms of 
fewer fatalities), but high military expenditures by both sides show some evidence of an arms 
race. The insignificance of Lmilppi and Lmilpip may also indicate the transformation of 
contemporary conventional war tactics, in which military size per se has a limited role in 
providing strategic depth. However the negative sign of Lmilppi and the positive sign of Lmilpip 
hints that higher militarisation in Pakistan may very well be an outcome of the ongoing 
hostilities between the two nations, as higher Pakistani military personnel has a deterrent 
effect, and the converse is true for India. Education expenditures Ledupi1 and growth rates 
Gpi relate significantly to conflict mitigation, and the size of coefficients suggests that the 
potential for spending on education in decreasing hostilities is quite substantial. Democracy 
also decreases the severity of conflict, but the low values of coefficients show the relationship 
is quite weak. 
Table 3 present results for multilateral trade with various proxies of military burden. In 
combination with various proxies of multilateral trade, the explanatory power of Lmilbrd1, 
Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd3 and Lmilbrd4 reduced, as they are generally insignificant, but the coefficients 
also reduce, especially for Xmpi and Xmip. The only military burden proxy that is consistently 
significant and comes out with the right sign is Lmilbrd6. This means that the present 
conclusion about the average conflict-enhancing role of military expenditures remains 
unaltered. Results in Table 3 also show that Xmpi is generally insignificant, whereas Xmip is 
significant in nearly all specifications. This is an interesting result, which suggests that higher 
Indian levels of trade integration mitigate conflict more than when Pakistani openness rises. 
However, the negative signs for both proxies confirm that greater openness in either country 
would significantly decrease conflict. Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that there is no 
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rivalry between India and Pakistan in terms of their trade with the rest of the world, and any 
competition to capture international market share is healthy. Table 6.3C shows results for 
average trade scores for both countries differentiated by exports and imports. Exports by both 
countries to the rest of the world relate negatively with conflict and the relationship is 
significant at the one per cent level. Also, note that the values of  increased further for it,3
combined exports when compared with the results in Table 2, indicating that the more these 
two countries are able to export to the rest of the world, the lower the levels of bilateral 
conflict. The high coefficients of Xmpi can lead the inference that the explanatory power for 
Xpi comes more from the Indian side. Both countries are at similar rungs on the technological 
ladder and share the potential to export to the rest of the world, along with countries like 
China. In contrast to exports, results on Lmpi1 and Lmpi2 show that rising imports do not 
increase hostilities, as the signs are always negative but the overall insignificance of combined 
import scores mean imports may not exert any negative pressure on hostilities either. The 
results for education expenditure, economic performance and democracy remain unchanged. 
Table 2  VAR regression equations for fatal under multiple specifications of bilateral trade and military burden
Left Hand Side Variable : FatalRight Hand Side
Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Bilateral Trade
Tpitp (16) -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.32*** -0..28*** -0.24** -0.23** -0.22**
Tpiti (16) -0.76* -0.76* -0.83** -0.70* -0.61* -0.64* 0.55*
Military Burdeñ̃̃̃̃̃
lmilbrd1 (6) 2.33* 2.02
lmilbrd2 (6) -2.33* -2.02
lmilbrd3 (6) 6.53* 6.03
lmilbrd4 (6) -3.45 -2.84
lmilbrd5 (2) 6.84** 6.54**
lmilbrd6 (1) 3.26* 3.52*
Lmilppi(2) -1.80
Lmilpip(2) 1.79
Social 
Development
Ledupi1(2) -4.98 -4.98 -4.83 -5.9* -6.35** -8.34*** -6.08** -6.7* -6.7* -6.9* -6.2* -5.9** -8.35*** -6.10**
Economic 
Growth
Gpi (1) -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.28*** -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.31*** -0.38*** -0.37***
Exogenous 
Variables
Demopi (7) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004* -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003* -0.004*
Poppi (10) 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.112*** 0.094*** 0.076*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.101*** 0.088*** 0.07***
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
R2 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.61 0.59 0.57
VAR(p) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2)
                                    -***, **, * shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
                                      - VAR (p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) 
                                          and the Hannan and  Quinn information criterion (HQIC),
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Table 3 VAR regression equations for fatal under multiple specifications of multilateral trade and military burden
 Left Hand Side Variable : Fatal
Right Hand Side
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Mutilateral Trade
Xmpi(3) -0.71 -0.71 -0.75 -0.74 -0.62 -0.77* -0.75*
Xmip(9) -3.74*** -3.74*** -3.77*** -3.74*** -3.89*** -2.68*** -3.83***
Military Burdeñ̃̃̃̃̃    
lmilbrd1 (6) 0.08 -0.18
lmilbrd2 (6) -0.08 0.18
lmilbrd3 (6) 0.91 0.27
lmilbrd4 (6) -0.58 0.50
lmilbrd5 (2) 0.04 -0.49
lmilbrd6 (1) 3.38** 2.26*
Lmilppi(2) -1.02
Lmilpip(2) 0.92
Social Development
Ledupi1(2) -3.64*** -3.64*** -3.59*** -3.69*** -3.60*** -8.07*** -2.85*** -4.73*** -4.73*** -4.67*** -4.79*** -4.44** -7.70*** -4.22***
Economic Growth
Gpi (1) -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.34*** -0.37*** -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.39*** -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.36*** -0.39***
Exogenous Variables
Demopi (7) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005***
Poppi (10) 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.094*** 0.062*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.078*** 0.101*** 0.075***
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.46
VAR(p) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1)
                                       -***, **, * shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
                                      - VAR (p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) 
                                          and the Hannan and  Quinn information criterion (HQIC),
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It would be interesting to run multivariate Granger causality tests to see if causality runs from the 
determinants of conflict-to-conflict, and whether there are cases of reverse causality. This research 
included Granger causality tests for each VAR specification, presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 4 
provides a summary of Granger causality tests for all endogenous regressors of conflict, and where 
there is an instance of reverse causality, it is noted. The results in Table 4 show that all regressors 
except Lmilppi, Lmilpip, Lmpi1 and Lmpi2 Granger cause conflict. There were also observations of 
some instances of reverse causality, especially for Tpitp, Tpiti, Lmilbrd5, Lmilbrd6, Ledpi1, Ledupi2 and 
Ledupi4 in case of Fatal, Lmilbrd6 in case of Volfatal, lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in case of Cnfpi, Lmilbrd6 and 
Ledupi1 in case of Dur, Lxpi2, Lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in case of Hstlvl and Lxpi2, Lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 
in case of Hiact. 
Table 4 Granger causality Wald tests
Direction of Causality Causes RC Direction of Causality Causes RC
FatalTpitp  (√)*** (√)* VolfatalGpi  (√)*** ×
FatalTpiti  (√)* (√)** CnfpiLxpi 2 (√)*** ×
FatalXmpi  (√)** × CnfpiLmilbrd 3 (√)*** ×
FatalXmip  (√)*** × CnfpiLmilbrd 4 (√)*** ×
FatalLxpi 1 (√)*** × CnfpiLmilbrd 6 × (√)*
FatalLxpi 2 (√)*** × CnfpiLedupi 1 (√)* (√)*
FatalLmpi 1 × × CnfpiGpi  (√)*** ×
FatalLmpi 2  × × DurLxpi 2 (√)*** ×
FatalLmilbrd 1 (√)** × DurLmilbrd 3 (√)*** ×
FatalLmilbrd 2 (√)** × DurLmilbrd 4 (√)** ×
FatalLmilbrd 3 (√)*** × DurLmilbrd 6 × (√)*
FatalLmilbrd 4 (√)*** × DurLedupi 1 (√)*** (√)***
FatalLmilbrd 5 (√)*** (√)** DurGpi  (√)*** ×
FatalLmilbrd 6 (√)*** (√)*** HstlvlLxpi 2 (√)*** (√)*
FatalLmilpip  × × HstlvlLmilbrd 3 (√)** ×
FatalLmilppi  × × HstlvlLmilbrd 4 (√)* ×
FatalLedupi 1 (√)*** (√)*** HstlvlLmilbrd 6 × (√)***
FatalLedupi 2 (√)*** (√)*** HstlvlLedupi 1 × (√)***
FatalLedupi 3 (√)*** × HstlvlGpi  (√)* ×
FatalLedupi 4 (√)*** (√)* HiactLxpi 2 (√)** (√)*
FatalGpi  (√)*** × HiactLmilbrd 3 × ×
VolfatalLxpi 2 (√)*** × HiactLmilbrd 4 × ×
VolfatalLmilbrd 3 (√)*** × HiactLmilbrd 6 × (√)***
VolfatalLmilbrd 4 (√)*** × HiactLedupi 1 (√)* (√)**
VolfatalLmilbrd 6 (√)*** (√)* HiactGpi  (√)* ×
VolfatalLedupi 1 (√)*** ×
***, **, * shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, RC stands for reverse causation, √ means causes and × means not causes
The reverse causality in the India-Pakistan bilateral trade measures show that low levels of trade 
are also an outcome of the India-Pakistan conflict, which has spanned more than 50 years. Any 
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decrease in hostility levels would also exert a positive and favourable effect on bilateral trade, which 
would create fertile ground for dispute resolution. Thus, more bilateral trade through reduction of 
tariffs is a noteworthy confidence building measure. The presence of reverse causality in average 
military spending is also not a surprise. This means that the India-Pakistan conflict is a significant 
cause of historically high military expenditures between both countries. Especially if high levels of 
conflict between India and Pakistan lower India’s military expenditure as a proportion of Pakistan’s 
military expenditure, then Lmilbrd1 and Lmilbrd3 would relate positively with conflict, which is the 
case in Tables 2. In light of the results, one interpretation may be that a military build-up by Pakistan 
increases as a response to conflict. This may be true because the dominant role of the army and high 
military expenditures in Pakistan are justified due to continuous high levels of hostility with its 
neighbour. Otherwise, Pakistan does not have any major dispute with any other nation, or frequent 
instances of intra-state disputes to justify the high budget allocation for defence. Reduction of 
hostilities would thus favourably affect the military burden in both countries, and both India and 
Pakistan could have more resources to channel towards its development and poverty reduction 
strategies. The reverse causality from conflict to education expenditure could explain this process. 
Reverse causality between conflict measures and proxies of education expenditure highlight the 
resource constraints faced by both sides due to their rivalry where funds allocated to defence seem to 
crowd out public investment in the development sector. Also found is reverse causality between Lxpi2, 
Hstslvl and Hiact. This result highlights the economic implication of conflict. If hostility levels rise and 
conflict moves closer to outright war, it will strangle export capability with the rest of the world for 
both countries. This will have negative effects on growth potential as well. For example, right after 
the 1971 and 1999 wars between Pakistan and India, total trade shares for both countries witnessed a 
deep decline. Economic growth Granger causes conflict and the relationship is negative. The growth 
patterns of both countries are independent of conflict, as far as reverse causality is concerned. The 
relationship is highly significant at a one per cent level in all the observed instances of Table 4. Any 
slowdown in growth rates in either of the two nations seems to correlate positively with conflict and 
this trend has been present since 1950. 
5. Conclusions:
Previous studies on the subject have measured conflict between both countries through their military 
expenditures. Such studies have put the blame on Pakistan for rising hostilities between two countries 
as Pakistan’ military budget as a proportion to GDP is much higher than that of India. However 
analysis in this paper refutes such claims. As per the practice in defence literature, this paper considers 
military expenditures as strategic assets and they are interacted with real proxies of conflict such as 
hostile actions and threats of using force by India or Pakistan and fatalities caused by cross border 
military actions. The study finds that Pakistan’s military expenditures always rise when fatalities of the 
conflict rise. But the rising military expenditures in Pakistan in return cause a fall in the threat level of 
a possible hostile action from Indian side resulting in ex post fall in fatalities. Eventually, the rise in 
military expenditures in Pakistan in response to rise in military expenditures in India is good for peace 
between both countries as the former create significant deterrence against the possibility of hostile 
actions from Indian side. 
The author also extends the analysis to capture political and economic linkages of the conflict. Note 
that the time period utilized in the study is from 1950-2007, thus capturing the historic dynamics of 
conflict as well as more contemporary economic explanations to it. The study finds that economic 
development abates the possibility of conflict and brings both countries closer to peace.  However 
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there is also evidence of economic competition. If Pakistan is able to export more to the outside world, 
hostility would rise from the Indian side. The converse is not true. Pakistan is again a peaceful nation 
when comes to trade competition. The evidence in this regards comes in 2002, when India tried to 
restrict Pakistan’s trading capabilities by unilaterally amassing troops in Pakistani borders. 2002 is the 
year when Pakistan started to witness an economic come back from the economic crunch of the 1990s. 
Later in 2007 Pakistan also lost GSP+ arrangement in EU on an Indian complain to WTO.  GSP+ 
provided Pakistan increased market access to EU for its products. Ever since GSP + was taken away, 
Pakistan’s market shares in EU have been declining.
Though military expenditures and economic development have been found to play a vital role in 
promotion of peace between India and Pakistan through deterrence effect, democracy in Pakistan also 
abates hostilities. Another important finding of the paper is that rise in education expenditures would 
bring both countries closer to the practice of real democracy and increase the possibility of peaceful 
solution to bilateral issues.  Here comes the paradox highlighted by the paper that high military 
expenditures squeeze education budgets in Pakistan and India, thus limiting the possibility of peace. 
In an ideal scenario, Pakistan and India should both curtail military budgets by focusing more on peace 
than conflict.
6. Notes on Empirical Results
6.1. Granger Causality and Military Burden 
Table 4 high-lights the country specific dynamics of military burden in India and Pakistan and nature of conflict. 
For example, if conflict lasts for more days, or hostilities rise or severity of action (i.e., in extreme case of out 
right war) rise between both parties, all would have a significant and positive shock on military expenditures in 
India and Pakistan as there is a presence of reverse causality between Lmilbrd6 and these measure of conflict 
but no presence of causality. No presence of causality means that arms race between India and Pakistan 
(Lmilbrd6) would not lead to rise in hostilities, neither increase the yearly duration of the conflict or lead to 
highest action (out-right war). This is an important result suggesting that higher military expenditures by both 
sides also have a deterrent effect on conflict, but if fatalities in the conflict rise, it will put a positive pressure 
on other measures of conflict, which in turn have positive shock on the arms race because we also find in table 
4 that Lmilbrd6, in presence of reverse causation, appears to also positively and significantly cause Fatal or 
Volfatal. In contrast, Lmildbrd1, Lmildbrd2, Lmildbrd3and Lmilbrd4, which are dynamic interactions of Indian and 
Pakistani military expenditures, significantly cause conflict while there is no reverse causation. This points out 
towards the prevalent mistrust between both parties and the reason behind the arms race, where Pakistan’s 
military expenditure is more sensitively related with conflict than the Indian military expenditure. Though, 
Pakistan may see its rise in military expenditure as deterrence to match Indian military expenditure, it would in 
effect has a positive effect on conflict as it would sustain hostilities between both parties at not only higher 
levels of severity but also the duration of the conflict on average would rise. Furthermore, Hiact (highest action 
in conflict) is not affected by military expenditures as all measures of military burden do not cause Hiact, though 
in case of Milbrd1, highest action in conflict positively influence the former suggesting that outright wars or 
increase in the severity of action would put upward pressure on the military expenditures of Pakistan and India 
much equally. In case of war, one may explain this relationship by simply suggesting that Pakistan and India 
spend more resources on military procurement to cover such depleted military assets which have been 
increasingly utilized in the conflict. 
6.2. Taking Inverse Ratios: “What They Really Show for Military Burden and Trade?”
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The nature of variables is dyadic, corresponding to the analysis which is so common in conflict studies which 
investigate conflict in dyadic settings. However, defence or trade or democracy would provide results which 
may only capture dyadic effects while may not reveal some very important country specific information. For 
example, high military expenditure is conflict enhancing and higher bilateral or multilateral trade is conflict 
reducing. Such assertions may be substantiated by theory or empirics but it may suffer from one limitation: if 
the dyadic variables are constructed in a fashion that they only capture average effects of the two parties 
involved, (e.g. Lmilbrd6) results may be misleading as in reality, one party may be more relevant than other or 
the two parties may work in opposite directions.
For example, in our case, Pakistan’s military expenditure is seen as conflict enhancing especially by Indian 
side. However, Pakistan sees military expenditure as a deterrence from outside (i.e., Indian) aggression 
suggesting that actually Indian military expenditure is fuelling the conflict. Indian, in contrast, traditionally see 
its high military expenditure as a deterrence to not only outside aggression but also inside civil unrest, whereby 
India has a high concentration of its military resources in the region of Kashmir. In the conflict literature, 
military expenditures are assets, which represent national capabilities to not only deter international conflict but 
also curtail any such civil unrest which may be a risk for economic development at national level. Thus 
relationship between military expenditures and conflict is not a linear one but a very dynamic one. Even if our 
dyadic proxy of military expenditure, which may take an average of India and Pakistan’s military expenditure, 
has a positive relationship with Conflict between two nations, we cannot say with certainty whether such 
empirical finding may lead to the conclusion that Military expenditures are conflict enhancing. It may be that 
Pakistani military spending is conflict enhancing and Indian military spending show an effect of deterrence 
(which means conflict reducing). Or it may be the opposite case. Another scenario may be that high military 
expenditure in India may show rivalry with a third party (China, a case in point) and thus may not be relevant 
at all in our analysis, while Pakistan may indeed be addressing its concerns viz-a-viz Indian hegemony and spend 
high on military build-up as a matter of deterrence. 
Please note that it is to our discretion to put Pakistan or India as a numerator or denominator. Changing 
the position may have implications due to case sensitivities (as we would find in case of Lmilbrd1 and Lmilbrd2). 
For example Lmilbrd 1, where India is in the denominator, has a positive sign suggesting Lmilbrd1 is conflict 
enhancing. However, Lmilbrd 2, where Pakistan is in the denominator, has a negative relationship with conflict, 
suggesting on its face value that Lmilbrd2 is conflict reducing. Both results are conflicting. According to our 
hypothesis, military burden for India and Pakistan, both should be conflict enhancing. That we do find for 
Lmilbrd6, which is just average of both. Hence, in the light of Lmilbrd6 and its relationship with conflict, the 
signs of Lmilbrd1 and Lmilbrd2 actually give away important information, which is about relative importance of 
India and Pakistan’s military expenditure in the conflict. If conflict is more related with Pakistani military 
expenditure then in case Pakistan military expenditure goes into the denominator, the sign should change and 
it does change in our regression models quite consistently satisfying maximum number of robustness checks. 
In the light of these results, a positive sign of Lmilbrd6 suggests that Indian military expenditure also enhance 
conflict, but it is less relevant than the Pakistani one to explain severity of conflict between both nations. 
In multilateral trade, inverse specifications serve this very analysis to investigate dyadic as well as country 
specific relationship to understand the dynamics of India-Pakistan conflict not only with its evolutionary 
settings but also with country specific perspective as to how trade may be related with conflict and thus suggest 
a peace strategy in rather comprehensive manner. For example, a higher coefficient of Xmip when compared 
to Xmpi shows that any rise in Indian trade with rest of the world has a proportionally greater effect on conflict 
mitigation than a rise in Pakistan’s trade with rest of the world. Economic integration by Indian side would 
decrease costs of peace for India at a much greater pace than if Pakistan integrates with rest of the world. Our 
theoretical model has covered such dynamic trade-offs for India and Pakistan. In undertaking such empirical 
methodology (not to mention the utilization of VAR), chapter 6 confirms or rejects many assertions which are 
put forward in academic as well as popular literature to explain India-Pakistan conflict. 
6.3. Why Granger Causality through a VAR?
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Since there is endogeniety problem between variables of interest, VAR can analyze the nature of relationship 
without assuming dependency of one variable over the other. Only granger causality tests, which follow VAR 
analysis, inform us about the direction of relationship and it may be the case, as we found in our analysis, the 
direction of relationship between a pair of variables is two way. This again is important information. Thus the 
purpose is to investigate nature (+ or -) of relationship between conflict variables and other endogenous 
independent variables (military burden, bilateral or multilateral trade, economic development etc), while also 
examining the direction of relationship. VAR provides one of the best time series methodologies. However, 
first we have to solve for random walk or trends in our time series variables. Since our variables of choice are 
dyadic in nature, we could solve for random walk at level instead of first difference.
As we can see, the data set is purely time series which may mean that most of the variables may suffer from 
random walk. Generally that is the case with most time series. If a regression employs non stationary or a mix 
of stationary and non-stationary variables, the error term would suffer from autocorrelation which would in 
turn mean that the error term obtained from such a regression would also be non stationary. Generally, non-
stationarity in variables may be solved by taking first difference of the series. It is not necessary to always take 
first difference and stationary may be achieved at level by taking time lags of variables where time trends or 
random walk would not be observed anymore: 
1. Stationary Time Series (Basic Characteristics): 
(a) Mean reverting around a constant long-run mean
(b) Constant variance which time-invariant
2. Non Stationary Time Series (Basic Characteristics)
(a) Has no long-run into which the series returns
(b) The variance depends on time and approached infinity as time goes to infinity
(A) Types of Non Stationarity
1. The random walk model with drift:
yt =  + yt-1 + ut  (6.19)
2. The deterministic trend process:
yt =  + t + ut  (6.20)
3. The explosive process:
yt =  + yt-1 + ut (6.21)
where  > 1. Typically, the explosive case is ignored and we use  = 1 to characterise the non-stationarity 
because: 
(a)  > 1 does not describe many data series in economics and finance.
(b)  > 1 has an intuitively unappealing property: shocks to the system are not only persistent through time, 
they are propagated so that a given shock will have an increasingly large influence. 
(B) The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test
Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Fuller (1976) developed the basic test for unit roots and order of integration. 
The basic objective of the test is to test the null hypothesis that  =1 in: yt = yt-1 + ut against the one-
sided alternative  <1. 
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We usually use the more convenient regression:
yt = γyt-1 + ut 
so that a test of =1 is equivalent to a test of γ=0 (since -1=γ).
yt = yt-1 + ut , yt- yt-1 = yt-1 - yt-1 + ut, yt = (-1)yt-1 + ut
Dickey and Fuller proposed three tests. The null (H0) and alternative (H1) models in each case are
i) H0: yt = yt-1+ut H1: yt = yt-1+ut, <1
This is a test for a random walk against a stationary autoregressive process of order one (AR(1))
ii) H0: yt = yt-1+ut H1: yt = yt-1++ut, <1
This is a test for a random walk against a stationary AR (1) with drift.
iii) H0: yt = yt-1+ut H1: yt = yt-1++t+ut, <1
This is a test for a random walk against a stationary AR (1) with drift and a time trend.
The three models can be described as cases with:
i) No intercept, no trend
ii) Intercept, no trend
iii) Intercept and trend
As the error term is unlikely to be white noise Dickey and Fuller extended their procedure suggesting an 
“augmented” version that uses p lags of the dependent variable
As the error term is unlikely to be white noise Dickey and Fuller extended their procedure suggesting an 
“augmented” version that uses p lags of the dependent variable. The alternative model in case (i) is now written:
A problem now arises in determining the optimal number of lags of the dependent variable. 
There are 2 ways
- use the frequency of the data to decide
- use information criteria 
In our case, we have taken dyadic proxies, and thus the problem of random walk may have been minimised 
and we may obtain stationarity for our variables at level rather than first differences.
6.4. Fatalities and Trade Relationship
What would be the impact of a 100 percent increase in bilateral trade or 
multilateral trade on Conflict (fatalities)? For example, the coefficients in 
table 2 and 3 suggest if bilateral trade or multilateral trade doubles, 
fatalities (Fatal) would witness a decrease of at least 2 points or 200 
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percent in case of multilateral trade and only 20 percent (less than a half point) in case of bilateral trade. This 
means if Fatal have scored 5, and trade with rest of the world doubles, Fatal will go down to score 3. Generally, 
Fatal has taken up score of 3 or 2, which means usually battle deaths have been either 26-100 deaths in case of 
score 2 or 101-250 deaths in case of score 3. With high coefficients of multilateral trade in reducing fatal, one 
may confer that multilateral trade (relationship with outside world) traditionally have been playing a key role to 
contain fatalities and also possibility of out right war between India and Pakistan. In contrast, bilateral trade has 
much smaller effect in containing fatalities and thus plays a very limited role in conflict mitigation between 
India and Pakistan. 
References:
Azar, E.E. (1980) ‘The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) Project’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 24(1): 143-152.
Avramides, C. (1997) Alternative models of Greek defense expenditure. Defense and Peace Economics 8 145–187. 
Benoit, E (1973) Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Boston: Lexington Books. 
Benoit, E. (1978) Growth and Defence in LDCs. Economic Development and Cultural Change 26, 271-80. 
Correa, H. and Kim, J.W. (1992) A causal analysis of the defense expenditures of the USA and the USSR. Journal of Peace 
Research 29 161–174.
Collier, P. (2006) ‘War and military expenditure in developing countries and their consequences for development’, The 
Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.10
Deger, S. and Sen, S. (1990) Military security and the economy: defense expenditure in India and Pakistan. In The 
Economics of Defense Spending: An International Survey, edited by K. Hartley and T. Sandler. London: Routledge. 
Dorussen, H. (1999) ‘Balance of Power Revisited: A Multi-Country Model of Trade and Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 
36(4): 443-62.
Dunne, Paul (1996) Economic Effects of Miltary Spending in LDCs: A Survey. In: Gleditsch, et al. (1996). 439-464. 
Feder, Gershon [1983] On Exports and Economic Growth. Journal of Development Economics 12, 59-73.
Dunne, J.P. and Perlo-Freeman, S. (2001) The demand for military spending in developing countries. Mimeo. Center for 
Applied Research in Economics, Middlesex University Business School. 
Elliot, G., T. Rothenberg and J. Stock (1996) ‘Efficient Tests for an Autoregressive Unit Root’, Econometrica 64: 813-36.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Adne Cappelen, Olav Bjerkholt, Ron Smith and Paul Dunne (eds) (1996) The Peace Dividend. 
(Contributions to Economic Analysis Series). Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Jones, D.M., S.A. Bremer and D.J. Singer (1996) ‘ Militarised Inter-state Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, 
and Empirical Patterns’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 15(2): 163-212.
Kollias, C. and Makrydakis, S. (1997) Is there a Greek–Turkish arms race? Evidence from cointegration and causality tests. 
Defense and Peace Economics 8 355–379. 
Majeski, S. (1985) Expectations and arms races. American Journal of Political Science 29 217–245. 
McClelland, C.A. (1978) ‘Warnings in the International Events Flow: EFI and Roz as Threat Indicators’, International 
Interactions 5(2-3): 135-204.
24
Mintz, A., Ward, M.D. and Bichler, S. (1990) Defense spending in Israel. In The Economics of Defense Spending: An 
International Survey, edited by K. Hartley and T. Sandler. London: Routledge. 
Polachek, S.W. (1997) ‘Why Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: The Relationship Between International 
Trade and Cooperation’, Review of International Economics 3: 295-309.
Polachek, S.W. and C. Seiglie (2006) ‘Trade, Peace and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic Dispute’, IZA DO No. 2170.
Polity IV Project (Center for International Development and Conflict Management), 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
Richardson, L.F. (1960) Arms and Insecurity, A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War, Pittsburgh, PA: The 
Boxwood Press.
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, Gernot Doppelhofer and Ronald I Miller (2004) Determinants of Long term growth: A Bayesian 
Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) approach, American Economic Review, September, 94,4, 813-835. 
Smith, Ron P (2000) Defence Expenditure and Economic Growth in Making Peace Pay: A Bibliography on Disarmament 
and Conversion. In: Nils Petter Gleditsch, Goran Lindgren, Naima Mouhleb, Sjoerd Smith and Indra de Soysa (eds.) 
Making Peace Pay: A Bibliography on Disarmament and Conversion. Laremont: Regina Books, 15-24. . 
Smith, R.P. (1995) The demand for military spending. In Handbook of Defense Economics, edited by K. Hartley and T. 
Sandler. Elsevier Science BV.
Singer, J.D. and Melvin Small (1972) The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook, New York: Wiley.
World Development Indicators (2006) Washington DC: World Bank.
Wright, Q. (1942) A Study of War, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Appendix1: Data Definitions
Dyadic Variables
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Conflict 
Cnfpi Intensity of Conflict between 
Pakistan and India, Scores 1 
(minor) when 25 to 999 battle-
related deaths and 2 (war) when 
at least 1000 battle-related 
deaths in a given year,
Years: 1950-2003, Sources: UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Data set Version IV, Harbom et al. 
(2006)
Dur Number of days a conflict lasts in 
a year between Pakistan and 
India,
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State 
War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al. (2004) 
Fatal Annual fatality level of conflict 
between Pakistan and India, 
scores from 0 to 6
0 None
1-25 Deaths
26-100 Deaths
101-250 Deaths
251-500 Deaths
501-999 Deaths
6 >999 Deaths
Years: 1950-2003, Sources: COW Inter-State 
War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al. (2004)
Hiact Highest action by Pakistan and 
India in annual corresponding 
dispute [bracketed numbers refer 
to corresponding hostility level]
 
0    No militarised action [1]
1    Threat to use force [2]
2    Threat to blockade [2]
3    Threat to occupy territory [2]
4    Threat to declare war [2]
5    Threat to use CBR weapons 
[2]
6    Threat to join war [2]
7    Show of force [3]
8    Alert  [3]
9    Nuclear alert   [3]
10   Mobilisation   [3]
11   Fortify border  [3]
12   Border violation   [3]
13   Blockade [4]
14   Occupation of territory  [4]
15   Seizure    [4]
16   Attack     [4]
17   Clash       [4]
18   Declaration of war    [4]
19   Use of CBR weapons  [5]
20   Begin inter-state war   [5]
21   Join inter-state war    [5]
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State 
War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al. (2004)
Hstlev  Annual hostility levels reached by 
India and Pakistan in each 
annual corresponding dispute
No militarised action
Threat to use force
Display of force
Use of force
War
Years: 1950-2003, Source: Faten et al. (2004)
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VolFatal Precise volume of fatality in each 
annual corresponding dispute,
Years: 1950-2003, Sources: COW Inter-State 
War Data, Version 3.02 (Faten et al. 2004), 
CSCW/PRIO Battle Deaths data (Lacina 2005), 
CSP Data set on Major Episodes of Political 
Violence 1946-2006 
http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm
Bi Lateral Trade
Tpitp Bilateral trade between Pakistan 
and India as a ratio of Pakistan’s 
total trade,
Years: 1950-2007, Source: Direction of Trade 
Statistics yearbook, IMF International Financial 
Statistics 2007 (IMF)
Tpit Bilateral trade between Pakistan 
and India as a ratio of India’s 
total trade,
Years: 1950-2007, Source: Direction of Trade 
Statistics yearbook, IMF International Financial 
Statistics 2007 (IMF)
Multilateral Trade
Xmpi Pakistan’s total trade (exports + 
imports) as a ratio of India’s total 
trade (exports + imports),
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2007 (IMF) 
Xmip India’s total trade (exports + 
imports) as a ratio of Pakistan’s 
total trade (exports + imports),
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2007 (IMF)
Lmpi1 Log GDP weighted average of 
Pakistan and India’s total 
imports,
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 20067(IMF)
Lmpi2  Log mean average of Pakistan’s 
total imports as a proportion of 
Pakistan’s GDP and India’s total 
imports as a ratio of India’s GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2008 (IMF)
Lxpi1 Log GDP weighted average of 
Pakistan and India’s total 
exports,
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2008 (IMF)
Lxpi2 Log mean average of Pakistan’s 
total exports over Pakistan’s 
GDP and India’s total exports 
over India’s GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2008 (IMF)
Military Burden
 
Lmilbrd1 Log of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP 
as a ratio of India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02, World Development 
Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and 
Economic Survey of Pakistan
 
Lmilbrd2 Log of India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP as 
a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s 
GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02, World Development 
Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 
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Lmilbrd 3  Log of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP 
as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP 
plus India’s defence expenditure 
over India’s GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02, World Development 
Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd 4 Log of India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP as 
a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP 
plus India’s defence expenditure 
over India’s GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02, World Development 
Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd5 Log of Mean average of India’s 
defence expenditure over GDP 
and Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02, World Development 
Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd6  Log GDP weighted average of 
Pakistan and India’s defence 
expenditures,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02, World Development 
Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF), Economic 
Survey of Pakistan, Economic Survey of India
Lmilppi Log of Pakistan’s military 
personnel over Pakistan’s total 
population as a ratio of India’s 
military personnel over India’s 
total population,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02 and International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Lmilpip Log of India’s military personnel 
over India’s total population as a 
ratio of Pakistan’s military 
personnel over Pakistan’s total 
population,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02 and International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Economic Growth
Gpi Weighted average of real GDP 
per capita growth rates for 
Pakistan and India, 
Years: 1950 to 2007. Sources: Pakistan 
Economic Survey, Indian Economic Survey, 
International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Democracy
Demopi Pakistan and India’s combined 
democracy score (by adding 10 
to India and Pakistan’s Polity2 
values for each year and then 
taking the product of these 
values in order to convert the 
variable in dyadic form),
Years: 1950-2007, Source: Polity IV Project 
(Centre for International Development and 
Conflict Management)
Population
Poppi Average of Pakistan’s total 
population and India’s total 
population
Years: 1950-2001, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Appendix 2:
India Pakistan Peace Negotiations in 2006
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Musharraf's Peace Proposals
 Pakistan gives up its claim to Indian-administered Kashmir if people 
from both regions have freedom of movement
 Neither part of Kashmir can become independent, but both can have 
a measure of self-governance
 Troops from both sides to be withdrawn in a staggered manner
 A joint mechanism to supervise both regions, in which people from 
India, Pakistan and Kashmir are represented
(BBC News: 7 Dec 2006)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south_asia/6217734.stm
Indian Response
 “The destinies of our two nations are interlinked. We need to put 
the past behind us” 
(Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh: Pakistani Newspaper ‘the 
Nation’, December 21, 2006)
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OUTCOME: Kashmir rivals re-open trade route
An old trade route has reopened after 60 years across the Line of Control (LoC) that divides disputed Kashmir.
“Trucks carrying fruit, nuts and honey were flagged off by Indian officials from Salamabad in Indian-
administered Kashmir under tight security. Lorries are expected to arrive later on Tuesday from the Pakistani side, 
bringing rice, rock salt and furniture. The opening of the trade route is part of a 2004 peace agreement between 
India and Pakistan, which both claim Kashmir. The trade link follows other confidence-building measures introduced 
in Kashmir in recent years, including the opening of rail and bus links.” 
Drum Beating: The BBC's Altaf Hussain says the atmosphere in Salamabad, on the Indian side of the LoC, on 
Tuesday morning was festive. (Tuesday, 21 October 2008 12:15 UK) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/south_asia/7681320.stm
"I have always dreamed of going to the other side (of LoC), but I never thought I would be driving a lorry there 
so soon" 
Truck driver Mohammad Arif
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ON THE SIDELINES of Peace:
Kashmir under indefinite curfew 
BBC NEWS: 24 August 2008
 The strikers want a referendum which they hope will lead to self-determination for the 
region. 
 Thousands of troops are enforcing the curfew in Srinagar
